Several countries have recently launched biofuel policies to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuels and secure their energy supply. The price increase due to this new demand for feedstock reduces the need for farm support programmes.
e¢ ciency of economic instruments aimed at supporting farmers' incomes. Indeed, biofuel subsidies (and mandatory blending) could be considered a new element in the already wide range of instruments at the regulator's disposal. Some authors have begun to investigate the links between agricultural policies and the new policies aiming at developing biofuels, as in Gardner (2007) and de Gorter and Just (2008) .
We develop a model that disentangles the various e¤ects that the support granted to biofuels may trigger. We show that with no constraint on biofuel production (e.g. coming from security of energy supply concerns), the government may …nd it worthwhile to implement a biofuel programme to diminish the social cost of the farm support programme: indeed, it may be socially bene…cial to implement such policies if costs of public funds are high.
This result might explain why biofuel programmes have been in place in the EU and the US for more than a decade. Considering the possibility of importing agricultural feedstock, the government may still take advantage of substitution between the farm support programme and the biofuel subsidy policy. This e¤ect leads to a higher domestic price of the agricultural commodity than the world price, relatively low import levels, and the biofuels produced from imported agricultural feedstock bene…ting from a lower subsidy than biofuels produced from domestic input. When the biofuel production constraint is binding, the optimal domestic production of feedstock exceeds the optimal (unconstrained) level of supply of agricultural raw product that prevails in autarky.
The e¤ects of biofuels on environmental policies are double-edged. On the one hand, biofuels are one of the main features of GHG mitigation policies in the transportation sector. On the other hand, sizeable production of energy crops will have major implications on environmental policies for the agricultural sector. Hence, the environmental externalities are positive for GHG emissions, but negative for agricultural production. There is thus an essential contradiction between setting a prominent objective for biofuel production that will lead (through higher prices) to higher yields and thus to an intensi…cation of agricultural production, and the adoption of sound agricultural practices. 4 The positive environmental externalities of biofuels regarding GHG emissions ought to be weighed against the nega-tive externalities generated by the production process of the agricultural raw material. We analyze the optimal trade-o¤ between GHG mitigation and sound agricultural production practices. We show that because of the social cost of public funds, the optimal standard is stricter than the Pigouvian level. Indeed, by setting a stringent environmental standard, the regulator increases the marginal cost of production, hence the price of the agricultural feedstock, which reinforces the substitution e¤ect between the biofuel subsidy policy and the farm support programme. However, this standard is less stringent if the cost of enforcing the environmental policy is taken into account. We analyze the e¤ects of a monitoring cost on biofuel production (assuming that production levels are not constrained) and on the agricultural environmental standard, assuming that the government can in ‡ict two types of monetary sanctions: …nes and cross compliance provisions. We compare these two policies and show that for a high level of biofuels, cross compliance provisions are less e¤ective than …nes.
The paper is organized as follows. First, our model is presented and the optimal production of energy crops is derived. The following section deals with the import scenario. Last, the environmental consequences of increased agricultural production are addressed, notably pertaining to the enforcement of the environmental policies directed at agriculture.
The model
Consider an economy with an agricultural sector, a food sector and an energy sector. All agents in this economy are price-takers. The production cost of the agricultural product is a¤ected by the farmers' environmental practices. Denote by C(X; e) the cost function of the representative farm, where X is the production level and e 2 [0; e M ] is an environmental index (e.g. the polluting emission level), with C Xe < 0. Hence, the more the farmer pollutes, the lower the marginal cost of production. 5 Both the food and energy industries use the agricultural feedstock in order to produce their own outputs (food products and biofuels, respectively). The total quantity of the agricultural product is thus split between the food (x F ) and energy (x E ) sectors: X = x F + x E . The production function of the representative 5 We also assume C(X; e) convex: we have C XX > 0; C ee > 0 and
…rm in the food industry is denoted by
The production function of the energy sector is f E (x E ) = x E ; where < 1 is a positive parameter.
Pro…t maximization of the representative farmer determines the inverse agricultural supply function, given by C X (X; e). Denote by p F (y F ) and p E the prices for the food and the energy products. p E is supposed una¤ected by the production of biofuel and such that:
i.e. the energy …rm production cost is greater than its revenue, whatever environmental standard e. We shall …rst consider in the following that the government has decided to grant energy …rms a per unit subsidy E which allows biofuel …rms to break even, 6 and then discuss mandatory blending. 7 As C XX > 0, the subsidy should rise with the desired quantity of energy crops, as the price of the domestic crop becomes higher. Hence, the demand coming from the energy …rms for the agricultural product is determined by the biofuel objective of the government. Total demand for the agricultural product is determined by the demand coming from the food industry and is deduced as follows. Solving the programme of the representative …rm of the food industry, given by:
where p F (y F ) and C X (X; e) are considered as constant, the equilibrium condition on the input market leads to an optimal input demand x F satisfying:
for all x E 0. For a given environmental index e, (EC) implicitly de…nes x F as a function of x E .
Optimal biofuel policy in autarky
The objective of the regulator is to maximize the sum of the surpluses of the di¤erent agents in the economy: farmers pro…ts A , food and energy industry pro…ts, F and E , the 6 We assume that the energy …rm has no private information: the regulator knows the …rm's technology and cost function. 7 We discuss the mandatory blending framework at the end of this section. Of course, other policies are possible, like, …rst of all, a Pigouvian tax on fossil fuels.
consumer surplus CS, 8 and the taxpayer surplus T . It also takes account of a guaranteed income A for farmers. Hence, the taxpayer must …nance the biofuel programme on the one hand and the direct payments to farmers on the other. The total cost of subsidizing the energy crops is given by x E E , while the parity income constraint leads to spending equal to A A ; corresponding to the decoupled payments awarded to farmers. The total public spending is a¤ected by 1 + in the Social Welfare Function (SWF), where is a positive parameter representing the social cost of public funds (see Fullerton, 1991 for a discussion on the value of ). We thus have:
The environmental e¤ects of the agricultural production are summarized in an environmental damage function D(e), with D 0 (e) > 0, i.e., the larger the farms'emissions, the greater the environmental damages. One of the regulator's tasks is to determine a socially desirable environmental standard e for agriculture. Of course the regulator also has to make sure that farmers do comply with the environmental guidelines. We …rst characterize the situation of costless enforcement implying e = e, and discuss the enforcement problem in a speci…c section. Last, an environmental bene…t stemming from the GHG mitigation e¤ect of biofuels is also accounted for in the SWF: let B(x E ) be this environmental bene…t and assume that B 0 (x E ) = q > 0. As explained above, the pro…t of the biofuel industry E is equal to zero.
Absent any constraint on biofuel production level, the government's program is given by:
International agreements or energy supply security concerns may oblige the agency to produce at least some given level Q of biofuel. This would introduce another constraint in programme (2), given by: x E Q= . To simplify the presentation, we do not include this constraint in the government programme, but we discuss the case of a binding biofuel production constraint in the following. Neglecting constant A , the Lagrangian of programme (2) may be written as:
8 CS is the Marshallian consumer surplus deriving from the consumption of food:
For a discussion on the use of consumer surplus, see Willig (1976) .
where is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the market equilibrium condition (EC).
The optimal policy satis…es the following …rst-order conditions:
and
Besides, we de…ne the derivative of x F with respect to x E for a given environmental standard e :
The reader can easily verify that solving equations (3)- (5) for e; x E and x F leads to the following result:
The optimal policy e ; x E and x F is implicitly de…ned by (EC),
Proof: See the appendix.
To interpret (6) , consider the case = 0. We would have
i.e., the Pigouvian rule that the optimal subsidy should equalize the marginal bene…t of GHG mitigation. With > 0, a binding constraint (6) implies that the optimal subsidy for biofuels (which entails the shadow cost of public funds) exceeds the marginal bene…t of GHG mitigation. More precisely, without any constraint on biofuel production, the regulator must choose a quantity of energy crops up to the point where the marginal social loss of subsidizing the biofuel sector equals the sum of the GHG positive externality and the marginal social gain of the transfer of revenue from the food sector to farmers. Indeed, the increase in the price of the agricultural raw product makes it possible to diminish the direct payment to farmers: a marginal increase dx E in biofuel demand transfers a revenue equal to (d=dx E ) [CS + F ] = x F C XX (X; e)dX=dx E from the food sector (the food industry and consumers) to farmers. This transfer allows the government to reduce the extent of the farm support programme, hence the corresponding tax distortions caused in the rest of the economy. For high levels of x F , the total subsidy outlay may in fact diminish: indeed, for a
given environmental standard e, we have:
where (X; e) is the price elasticity of the agricultural crop supply, given by (X; e) = C X (X; e)=[XC XX (X; e)]. Hence, the variation in total public spending may be negative provided that the elasticity of agricultural supply is low and x F =X, the share of food sector demand in the total demand for feedstock, is large. A su¢ cient condition to have a strictly positive level of biofuel at the optimum of the government's programme is that (6) being strictly positive when no biofuel programme is in place and all the agricultural crops are used as an input for the food industry (i.e., x E = 0 and x F = X 0 , the feedstock production level bought by the food sector when no biofuel is produced):
Leaving aside GHG mitigation concerns (i.e. even with q = 0), we have x E > 0 if s ( e) de…ned by:
Consequently, when the shadow cost of public funds is large, the regulator should implement a biofuel programme for the reason that transferring income from the food sector to farmers allows it to reduce the social cost of the farmer income support policy. In order to give a hint of the value of s , consider rapeseed production in the EU-15. With a price elasticity of the agricultural crop supply equal to 0:28 (see the FAPRI elasticity database), p E =C(X 0 ; e) = 0:5 and a 10% decrease in the consumption of rapeseed by the food industry,
i.e. (dx F =dx E )j x E =0 = 0:1, we have s = 0:18. This value is below the lower boundary of the range of given in the literature (0.2 to 0.6). Therefore, a strictly positive quantity of biodiesel ought to be produced in the EU-15, on purely redistributive grounds.
Equation (7) allows us to characterize the optimal standard policy. The last term of (7) corresponds to the marginal social surplus of agricultural production under standard e :
is the marginal damage and C e (X ; e ) the marginal reduction in production cost which corresponds to a social bene…t (1 + )C e (X ; e ) in public funds. 9 The Pigouvian rule calls for an environmental standard that nulli…es this surplus. The …rst term of (7) corresponds to the marginal social surplus of biofuel production, with the marginal social loss of subsidizing the biofuel sector given by (1 + )[C X (X ; e ) p E ] and the value of the social bene…t of GHG mitigation given by q. The Pigouvian level also requires that this marginal surplus is null. However, we know from (6) that this marginal surplus is equal to the marginal social gain of the transfer of revenue from the food sector to farmers, which is positive whenever > 0. With a positive social cost of public funds, as C XX =C Xe is negative, the marginal damage of agricultural production is lower than its marginal social bene…t, implying that the optimal standard e is lower than the Pigouvian level. This can be easily understood: by setting a stringent environmental standard, the regulator increases the marginal cost of production (we have C Xe < 0), hence the price of the agricultural feedstock which reinforces the substitution e¤ect between the biofuel subsidy policy and the farm support programme.
Let us now consider the case of a policy constrained to reach a given level of biofuel production Q. We then have x E = Q= and the …rst-order conditions with respect to x F and e lead to the optimal policy (x c F ; e c ) that satis…es:
where
F . Again (8) implies that e c is lower than the Pigouvian level e P corresponding to the production level X c implied by Q.
Mandatory blending
The main economic instruments to promote biofuels are subsidies. However, governments tend to rely more and more upon a second type of instrument which does not harm public …nances: mandatory blending. In this situation, the consumer is compelled to use a given amount of biofuels E x E . We still assume that the biofuel …rm satis…es the demand and that the government reimburses its production cost. As a result, the consumer faces a higher price for gasoline: indeed, the price of the "aggregate gasoline" (i.e. fossil fuel mixed with a given proportion of biofuel) is
Denoting by CS(y F ; y G ) the consumer's surplus corresponding to a consumption bundle (y F ; y G ) of food products and gasoline, the regulator's programme is written as follows:
Neglecting the constant A , the Lagrangian of programme (9) may be written as:
where is the multiplier corresponding to the market equilibrium condition (EC). The optimal policy satis…es the following …rst-order conditions:
and @L
Using (EC), (10) and (11) leads to the following condition:
Rearranging terms, we obtain the following result: 10 The subscript "E" refers to the biofuel while "G" refers to the composite good made up of fossil fuel and biofuel, which is used by the consumer. As before, "F" refers to the aggregate food good.
Proposition 2
If is large, the optimal policy with mandatory blending is implicitly de…ned by (EC) and
Compared to the optimal subsidy policy x E ; x F and e , we have x
M B E
> x E and e M B < e .
The level of biofuels produced in the case of a mandatory blending framework is greater than with a subsidy. This result is hardly surprising, as the consumer surplus is a¤ected by a weight equal to 1 in the Social Welfare Function, while the taxpayer surplus is weighted
As concerns environmental standard e, the mandatory blending framework imposes a more stringent level: as the taxpayer only pays for the decoupled payment directed at the farmers, the price increase of the agricultural raw material can be pushed a step further.
Importation of energy crops
The results of the previous section are limited to a quantity produced domestically. However, buying energy crops on the world market could prove less expensive for society. 11 We now consider that the energy …rm may also buy its raw material on the world market. Let X E be the total quantity of energy crops, X E = x E + x I , where x E is the domestic energy crop and x I 12 the imported one, bought on the world market at price w from a perfectly elastic supply.
The subsidies awarded by the regulator to the biofuel sector are E = C X (X; e)= p E for domestic energy crops, and I = w= p E for imported energy crops. The biofuel subsidy is thus given by S = ( E x E + I x I ): With no biofuel production constraint, the regulator's assessing the consequences of the removal of import duties on ethanol (i.e. mainly Brazilian) in the US. 12 Note that we consider in this model that the imported raw material can only be used to produce biofuels.
This stems, e.g., from a ban on genetically modi…ed crops, as it is the case in the EU. This ban concerns the Canadian canola or the Argentinian Soyabean to produce biodiesel in the EU.
programme can be written as:
Denoting byx E ;x I ;x F andê the optimal regulator choices, the biofuel feedstocks levels must satisfy the following conditions:
whereX =x E +x F . The latter condition states that (absent any constraint on the biofuel production), the optimal imported crop level equates the marginal social cost of subsidizing the biofuel industry with the marginal environmental bene…t of biofuel. If q is large, it is optimal to import as much agricultural commodity as possible because of the positive GHG mitigation e¤ects. We assumed that it is not the case and consequently that we havê x I = 0 when the government has no minimal biofuel production objective (i.e.we assume that w > p E q=(1 + )). Compared to (17) , condition (16) entails the marginal social gain of the transfer of revenue from the food sector to the farmers, which eases the condition for a positive level of domestic biofuel crops. As (16) is similar to (6), the resulting demand levels are the same as those obtained in the case of a closed economy: we havex E = x E ,
If the country faces a minimal biofuel production level Q > x E , energy crops produced domestically exceed level x E . Indeed, substituting Q= x E forx I in programme (15) and maximizing inx E andx F gives the following condition:
which implicitly de…nesx E . Plugging x E =x E into (16) and using (18) to substitute for the …rst term, we get:
which implies thatx E > x E . Hence, taking imports into account, we have the following results:
Proposition 3 When the government can import the agricultural feedstock at price w > p E q=(1 + ):
With no constraint on the biofuel production level, it is optimal to produce energy crops if is large. All the agricultural feedstock is produced domestically and we havê
If the government has a biofuel production objective Q > x E , it is optimal to produce energy crops domestically at levelx E > x E implicitly de…ned by (18) . Importations of raw materials are given byx I = Q= x E . The internal price of the agricultural feedstock veri…es C X (X;ê) > w leading to subsidies E > I .
Policy enforcement and cross-compliance
In this section, we discuss the problem of de…ning the environmental standard considering the enforcement issue of such a policy, following the seminal paper by Becker (1968) . 13 Indeed, to enforce a demanding policy it is necessary for the State to inspect farms frequently and to be able to in ‡ict sizeable penalties. We shall analyze this problem in a framework similar to Malik (1992) , considering that inspecting farms is costly and that the government in ‡icts penalties that depend on the extent of the infringement. We analyze the two cases of an exogenous maximal penalty, and of a maximal penalty which corresponds to the farmer's decoupled payment, as is the case in the EU. We do not consider importations in this section.
Assume that whenever a farmer has chosen an emission level e that exceeds the standard e, the agency is able to in ‡ict a penalty that depends on the extent of the farmer's infringement, e e, and more precisely that the corresponding penalty is a fraction f (e e) 2 [0; 1] of a maximal penalty . The function f ( ) is exogenously given (by an independent legislative body) and is assumed increasing and convex in e e, with f (0) = 0. The maximum penalty can either be a given amount P (also determined by an independent legislative body), or the decoupled payment that the farmer should receive in case of compliance, i.e.
A A (X; e): The latter case corresponds to the current framework chosen by the EU to enforce environmental policies in agriculture. Let k be the probability of being inspected, and k the corresponding cost.
Denoting by w the price of the agricultural product, the representative farmer solves the following maximization programme: max X;e wX C(X; e) kf (e e)
Maximization with respect to e gives an optimal level e which satis…es:
i.e., the marginal cost reduction from pollution must be lower than (or equal) to the marginal expected penalty. Since there is no social bene…t associated to the payment of …nes, we have e = e at the optimum of the government's programme: no …ne is paid in equilibrium.
Moreover, as inspecting farms is costly, this condition is binding at the optimum of the agency programme, i.e. we have:
The agency simultaneously chooses the optimal level of inspection, the environmental standard and the scope of the biofuel programme by maximizing the following programme:
Assuming an interior solution for the biofuel level, we have the following result:
Proposition 4 Taking account of the cost of inspection, the optimal (unconstrained) policies verify:
In the case of a …xed maximal penalty ( = P ),
assuming that the optimal policy e f ; x
In the case of cross-compliance provisions ( = A A );
assuming that the optimal policy e cc ; x cc E and x cc F is such that x cc E > 0:
We have e f > e and x cc
Compared to the costless enforcement policy (x E ; e ), the cost of inspections introduces distortions in the agency's trade-o¤s, resulting in lower biofuel production levels and less stringent environmental standards. However, the distortion on the production side is lower with a …xed penalty than under cross-compliance provisions. Not surprisingly, the emissions level taking the cost of inspection into account is higher than when enforcement is costless. Indeed, allowing for more emissions reduces the farmer's gain from exceeding the environmental standard, which in turn allows the frequency of inspection to be diminished.
Consider now that the government is constrained by a biofuel objective Q and suppose it desires to enforce a given environmental standard e. Denote by X(Q; e) the agricultural production implied by the equilibrium condition (EC). The corresponding monitoring e¤orts under …xed penalty, k f , and cross-compliance, k cc , can be deduced from (IC). We have:
and the same condition holds for the welfare levels reached under the two alternative governmental policies. Hence, cross-compliance may prove the most e¢ cient policy if P is low compared to the parity income and if agricultural production X(Q; e) is low. However, for large biofuel objectives, the government is more likely to choose a …xed penalty policy. Indeed, e cc (Q), the optimal environmental standard under cross-compliance given the biofuel objective Q, increases implying that A (X(Q; e cc (Q)); e cc (Q)) also strictly increases with Q.
Hence, for any objective greater than Q s inffQ 0 : A (X(Q; e cc (Q)); e cc (Q)) A P g, the government is able to implement the optimal environmental standard of the crosscompliance policy with a …xed penalty policy and to reduce its monitoring e¤ort and thus the cost of the enforcement policy.
Conclusion
The main results of this paper can be summed up as follows. First, we have shown that biofuel programmes may allow the regulator to operate a partial substitution between decoupled payments and the support for biofuels. This substitution is detrimental to the food industries (and to consumers). However, when the social cost of public funding is high, the regulator should …nance a biofuel programme because of its redistributive property. Of course, this result rests on the existence of su¢ ciently high distortions in the tax system.
The positive environmental externalities attributed to the substitution of biofuels for fossil fuels tend to push the optimal biofuel quantity a step further. We also developed a simple framework which took account of the possibility of imports: thanks to the saving of public funds permitted by biofuels, the optimal level of energy crops produced domestically is set at a level where the interior price exceeds the world price for energy crops. The conclusions drawn in the case of a biofuel programme …nanced through subsidies can also be made when biofuels are promoted thanks to a mandatory blending scheme. The optimal level of biofuels that ought to be produced is even higher in that case.
The second part of the article has been dedicated to the environmental consequences of biofuel programmes in the agricutural production process. It is generally acknowledged that the environmental externalities linked to use of biofuels in cars are positive, while the environmental externalities of agricultural production are negative. Our model suggests that the regulator ought to set an environmental standard that is more stringent than the Pigouvian level. This increases the price of the raw material, thereby enhancing the substitution e¤ect between the programme of decoupled payments and the biofuel programme. Taking the environmental policy enforcement problem into account, the monitoring cost on the one hand and the incentive constraints on the other hand change the optimal energy crop quantity and the optimal environmental standard.
We have tried to keep our model as simple as possible. However, many re…nements could be implemented. First, we have considered that the subsidies were …ne-tuned. This assumption could be criticized, as there are informational asymmetries between the regulator and the biofuel …rms. In the mandatory blending framework, such informational asymmetries are not relevant but informational rents could well be replaced by monopolistic rents for biofuel producers. For instance, the major biodiesel …rm in France covers more than 75% of the market. We have also assumed a perfectly competitive agro-food sector. Relaxing this assumption may well lead to very stringent conditions for a socially valuable subsidy substitution e¤ect between the farm support and the biofuel programmes.
Proof of proposition 1
From (EC), we have @g=@x E = C XX and @g=@e = C Xe : Rearranging terms of (3) yields:
Plugging into (4) and (5) gives:
Rearranging terms gives (7).
Proof of proposition 2
Denoting by S (x E ; x F ; e ) the optimal subsidy policy, we have, using (10), (11) and (6):
Similarly, using using (10), (12) , (3)and (5):
Proof of proposition 3
Substituting Q= x E for x I in the government's programme leads to the following Lagrangian (neglecting the constants):
The …rst-order conditions are:
and give:
deriving the following condition:
Proof of proposition 4
Neglecting constant A , the Lagrangian of the governments'programme may be written as:
where and are the multipliers corresponding to (EC) and (IC). In the case of a …xed maximum penalty, we have:
Using (EC), (21) and (22) leads to:
while (24) and (IC) give:
Consequently, we have:
0)
Similar computations give
Using @g=@e = C Xe and @g=@x E = C XX we get:
Denoting by S (x E ; x F ; e ) the solution of programme (2), we have: 
